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Abstract. In the Discourses, Machiavelli refers early on to 
Polybius' cycle of regimes; however, he will not make much 
use of it afterwards. He still refers to a particular cycle, but 
one implicit in his writings and substantially different from 
Polybius. I propose in this paper to reconstruct Machiavelli's 
own political cycle, using the modern language of rationality 
and emotions in an agent-based model. Our starting point 
will be a list of individual motivations, their interplay in 
political action, and their effects on the regime. We will find 
in Machiavelli's work a model founded on three types of 
regimes – tyranny, principality, and republic – and a cycle of 
foundation, succession, degeneration, corruption, and re-
foundation of the regimes. 
 






Résumé. Dans les Discours, Machiavel fait référence tôt au 
cycle des régimes de Polybe; cependant, il n’en fera pas 
grand usage par la suite. Il se réfère toujours à un cycle 
particulier, mais de manière implicite dans ses écrits et 
substantiellement différent de celui de Polybe. Je propose 
dans cet article de reconstruire le propre cycle politique de 
Machiavel, en utilisant le langage moderne de la rationalité 
et des émotions dans un modèle fondé sur l’agent. Notre 
point de départ sera une liste de motivations individuelles 
qui interagissent dans l’action politique et des effets sur le 
régime. Nous trouverons dans l’œuvre de Machiavel un 
modèle fondé sur trois types de régimes – tyrannie, princi-
pauté et république – et un cycle de fondation, succession, 
dégénérescence, corruption et refondation des régimes 
 






Since the last century, many scholars have offered interpre-
tations of Machiavelli's political system, especially in relation 
to republicanism. The vast majority of these works turn out 
to be complex and quite hard to follow however, mainly 
because Machiavelli himself presented his thoughts in a 
convoluted manner. While the tradition in Machiavellian 
political studies is to dive as deep as possible into the texts in 
order to retrieve as much concepts and relationships as 
possible, I propose in this paper to reconstruct Machiavelli's 
political system using a "bare bones" approach. Machiavelli 
himself proposed a simplified model largely based on Polyb-
ius' cycle of regimes (D, 1, II/195-201)1, but as is well-known, 
he did not make much use of it afterwards.2 I am convinced 
that a similar model can be built from a set of human moti-
vations and social mechanisms found in Machiavelli's works. 
The originality of my approach resides in the "misuse" of 
many notions found in Machiavelli and my "translation" of 
them in the modern language of rationality and emotions. 
In the Polybian cycle or anacyclosis, Machiavelli tells us 
that there are six types of regimes, three good (principality, 
aristocracy, democracy) and three bad (tyranny, "govern-
ment by the few", anarchy). The good regimes are main-
tained by people who work for the common good, and the 
bad ones by people who work only for themselves. The pas-
sage from good to bad is caused by the forgetfulness of men, 
who let go of the necessity of insuring stability, and the 
reverse passage is caused by the masses revolting against 
their corrupt leaders. The ideal republic according to Machi-
avelli is a balanced mixture of all three good regimes sus-
tained by institutions, of which Rome is the prime example3. 
The three main features of the Polybian cycle are first, that 
the decline of regimes is natural and inevitable; second, that 
the main degenerative mechanism is the forgetfulness of 
successive rulers; and third, that the nature of each regime 
depends entirely on which preceded it. I will contend that 
Machiavelli fully endorses the first feature, but that he has 
reservations about the other two. 
The system I will try to reconstruct will be composed of 
three regimes: tyranny, principality and republic. They will 
be differentiated by the prevalent type of power relations, 
respectively personal power, informal legitimate authority, 
and formal legitimate authority. The actors of these regimes 
are by and large rational, but they can often exhibit irration-
al motivations like ambition, goodwill, and contempt. They 
can also show virtù, a disposition to act rationally with the 
common good in mind. These motivations will be the subject 
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of the first part of this paper. The second part will introduce 
the "humors", or the two fundamental political classes of the 
Great (il grandi) and the masses, along with the social 
mechanisms managing their interaction. We will expose the 
political system in the third part, which will consist of a cycle 
of foundation, succession, degeneration, corruption, and 
refoundation of the regime. 
 
Rational and irrational motivations 
 
It seems rather self-evident to refer to rational choice in 
reconstructing Machiavelli's political philosophy. His anal-
yses are almost always founded on individual action,4 and 
time and again, he tells us about people deliberately maxim-
izing their interests. There is a variant of rational-choice 
theory proposed by Jon Elster (1999) called the "mixed-
motivations" model, that distinguishes rational from emo-
tional motivations. While many rational-choice models treat 
emotional motivations as if they were subtle forms of ration-
ality, the mixed-motivations model claims that emotions can 
often bias or even block the cognitive capacities necessary 
for rational decision-making, therefore making a strong case 
to keep these motivations separate. 
Machiavelli's method in describing political life consists 
in attributing a series of specific motivations to idealized 
individual agents, then characterizing social phenomena as 
interplay between these motivations,5 Among them, Machia-
velli relates love, fear, and hatred to calculated interest, so 
we will classify them as rational motivations. As we will see, 
Machiavelli excuses many such behaviors precisely because 
the agent is deliberately pursuing his interest. On the other 
hand, there is a set of motivations that prevents rational 
behavior, what we call emotional motivations. We identify 
two main types: ambition, which makes the agent prefer 
destructive goals, and goodwill (and its converse contempt), 
which prevents the agent from properly evaluating his inter-
est. 
Machiavelli asserts that "men are driven chiefly by two 
things: love and fear" (D, 3, XXI/477). According to The 
Prince, chapter XVII, the difference is between choice and 
necessity: "For love is held by a chain of duty which, since 
men are bad, they break at every chance for their own profit; 
but fear is held by a dread of punishment that never fails 
you" (P, XVII/62), and further, "men love at their own 
choice and fear at the prince's choice" (64). Ideally, the 
Prince should seek to be feared without being hated, "this he 
will always achieve if he refrains from the property of his 
citizens and his subjects and from their women" (62-3; also 
P, XIX/67-8). 
We propose to model love, fear, and hatred as motiva-
tions originating from a conscious and intentional evaluation 
of the situation; in other words, the agent adopts the attitude 
that maximizes his utility given the circumstances. The 
citizen acts out of love of the Prince whenever they share 
common interests, either naturally or stimulated by incen-
tives from the Prince, and the citizen will rescind his love the 
moment the will of the Prince ceases to serve his own inter-
est (Patapan 2006: 88). In order to secure the citizen's loyal-
ty, the Prince should look to establish a relationship based 
on fear, by resorting to the threat of sanctions in such a way 
that it becomes in the interest of the citizen to obey. Love 
and fear thus become very similar rational motivations, but 
with a fundamental difference: love relies on benefits that 
the citizen can freely ignore whenever he loses interest, while 
fear relies on sanctions that are impossible to ignore. The 
citizen, however, can consider a sanction to be too severe; 
this would transform rational obedience into a will to rise up 
against the source of oppression. This new motivation is 
hatred, it appears when the utility of revolt (i.e. its 
cost/benefit ratio) for the agent becomes higher than the 
utility of coerced obedience6. 
Let us turn now to the emotional motivations, starting 
with ambition. Machiavelli refers to avarice sometimes, but 
it is essentially the same as ambition7. Ambition is a natural 
flaw that drives someone to try to possess everything. Mach-
iavelli condemns this motivation in two passages: 
 
Whenever men cease fighting through necessity, they go to 
fighting through ambition, which is so powerful in human 
breasts that, whatever high rank men climb to, never does 
ambition abandon them. The cause is that Nature has made 
men able to crave everything but unable to attain every-
thing. Hence, since men's craving is always greater than the 
power to attain, they are discontented with their acquire-
ments and get slight satisfaction from them. (D, 1, 
XXXVII/272). 
 
Moreover, human wants are insatiable, since man has from 
Nature the power and wish to desire everything and from 
Fortune the power to attain but little; the result is unending 
discontent in human minds and weariness with what is at-
tained. Hence the present is blamed, the past is praised, and 
the future is desired, even though men are not moved to act 
in this way by any reasonable cause. (D, 2, preface/323). 
 
In the first passage, the agent driven by ambition incurs 
costs greater than the benefits, while in the second, his ac-
tions lack "reasonable cause". Machiavelli goes further in 
The Golden Ass, V, where he notes that faced with "the pow-
erful" seized with ambition, "they are discontented who have 
lost, and hatred is stirred up to ruin the conquerors. (...) This 
appetite destroys our states; and the greater wonder is that 
all recognize this transgression, but no one flees from it" (in 
Gilbert, vol. 2: 762). The irrationality of ambition could not 
be clearer. Ambition is always a negative term, a character 
defect in Machiavelli's works (D'Amico 1997: 7). 
The Prince can command obedience by means other than 
positive or negative incentives. He can also cultivate a repu-
tation of leadership, which would make his followers obey 
naturally, in the sense that it would become "the natural 
thing to do" and not the result of calculation. Goodwill is the 
motivation that makes one follow the leader out of respect, 
and contempt the reverse motivation. We find a discussion 
of these motivations in The Prince, XIX, where Machiavelli 
urges the Prince to avoid being hated or despised. We al-
ready covered how to avoid hatred: do not put your subjects 
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in a situation in which it would be rational to engage in 
revolt. To avoid contempt, the Prince must acquire qualities 
found in good leaders: "It makes him despised to be consid-
ered changeable, light, effeminate, faint-hearted, irresolute -
- from which a wise prince guards himself as from a shoal. 
He strives to make everyone recognize in his actions great-
ness, spirit, dignity, and strength" (68). Noteworthy in this 
chapter is the use of "goodwill" (benivolenzia populare) 
instead of "love" to describe the relationship based on repu-
tation8. Goodwill is not a rational decision subject to evalua-
tion like love, but an immediate obligation towards someone 
representing the values favored by the community.9 The 
citizen obeys the Prince because he shares fundamental 
values with him, not because it is in his interest to do so. 
Obedience thus becomes an end in itself rather than a means 
to make a profit or to avoid punishment. Contempt arises 
when the Prince upholds values contrary to those favored by 
the people. Faraklas (1997: 58-60) first opposes contempt to 
fear then brings out a contradiction among the Great, as they 
appear to simultaneously fear and despise the people.10 I 
believe it would be better to oppose contempt to goodwill on 
the basis of reputation. This allows us the possibility of an 
agent despising and fearing someone at the same time; for 
example, obeying the Prince out of fear of sanctions but 
without respecting his values, or in the case of the Great, 
showing contempt for the people while being careful not to 
provoke them into rebellion. 
 
Virtù and fortune 
For Machiavelli, successful political leaders either possess 
virtù or are the beneficiaries of good fortune. Machiavellian 
virtù is a surprisingly vague concept, considering the relative 
clarity of most of his other thoughts regarding human behav-
ior.11 I would not classify virtù as a motivation alongside 
rationality and the emotions. I propose rather to define it as 
the behavior of an agent capable of control over his emotions 
in order to make well-calculated and rational choices. Mach-
iavelli always uses virtù as a mark of approval, so we can 
conclude that for him, good behavior is rational behavior, 
where passions are contained as much as possible. 
Virtù is for Machiavelli a rare attribute. The vast majority 
of men cannot resist their passions. They are naturally bi-
ased towards immediate gratification to the detriment of 
their future. Beyond the rational -- emotional distinction, we 
come across a distinction between short-term and long-term 
rationality. In rational-choice theory, the satisfaction of 
immediate interests is not ceteris paribus less rational than 
long-term well-being. Machiavelli, however, is concerned 
with political life, and contrary to certain modern rationali-
ty-based schools of thought like libertarianism and "invisible 
hand" regulation of society, he remains highly skeptical of 
the possibility of a natural equilibrium in which the state 
could maintain a stable existence through the interaction of 
short-sighted rational agents. The fundamental dynamic of 
Machiavellian politics arises from this position: emotional 
and short-term selfish acts lead to serious collective-action 
problems that only men of virtù, or an especially favorable 
fortune, can solve. Virtù is the attribute of a rational agent 
who always takes into account the consequences of his ac-
tions on social equilibria, especially regarding the freedom of 
the state from which he draws important individual benefits 
of security and prosperity. 
Fortune also plays an important role in maintaining sta-
bility and freedom in the state. In Machiavelli's work there 
are many allusions to fortune in a deterministic sense. How-
ever, this does not mean that there is some sort of historical 
"law" or "reason" at work in history. Machiavelli's determin-
ism, if we can call it that, is limited by two considerations. 
First, knowledge of the future cannot be anything else than 
deduction, more or less intuitive or informed, based on 
observation of the present and understanding of the past, 
combined with certain postulates on human nature. There 
are no laws of history to be found in Machiavelli. Second, 
Machiavelli clearly indicates that choice remains available in 
fortune: "(...) Fortune may be mistress of one half our ac-
tions but that even she leaves the other half, or almost, un-
der our control" (P, XXV/90). Even if "men are able to assist 
Fortune but not to twart her" (D, 2, XXIX/408), they remain 
capable of action based on prediction of the future, in the 
same way that we build dykes in expectation of a flood (P, 
XXV/90). I do not seek to neglect the role of fortune in 
Machiavelli. The agent is never entirely free in his actions; 
instead of deliberate choice, perhaps it would be better to 
speak of a will anchored on "necessity well understood" 
(Mansfield 1981: 303).12 But in any case, as it is impossible 
for an agent to know the future, the exact meaning of fortune 
is not that much relevant to behavior. From the standpoint 
of the deciding agent there is no difference between random 
fortune and a deterministic but radically obscure fortune. In 
both cases the agent will calculate expected utility in exactly 
the same way. 
 
The interplay of humors 
 
Machiavelli's entire political theory relies on the antagonism 
between the two "humors" or political classes, the Great and 
the people. The first task of a leader is to maintain an orderly 
state of conflict among the humors in order to keep the state 
stable and strong, especially against foreign intervention. 
Before we elaborate on the cycle of regimes, we will build a 
model of the humors featuring the motivations we have just 
defined. 
From the beginning, the Great and the people have oppo-
site political objectives: "the people desire not to be bossed 
and oppressed by the rich; the rich desire to boss and op-
press the people" (P, IX/39). These objectives are what sepa-
rates them; not wealth, function, or any other social division 
(Lefort 1972: 382). In political life, each fears the other, as 
the Great happen to have access to a large amount of re-
sources, and the people show strength in numbers. From 
this reciprocal existential threat, it is in the interest of each 
to have a ruler that will protect them against the other. The 
behavior of the people towards the ruler is shaped by ration-
ality and goodwill, while the Great are mainly motivated by 
ambition, contempt and rationality, with little goodwill since 
most of them consider themselves equal to the ruler (P, 
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IX/39).13 Machiavelli advises the ruler about three types of 
Great: he should "honour[] and love[]" those who "commit 
themselves" and are not "rapacious"14, he should "make use" 
of those who are rational, and "fear" the ambitious (P, 
IX/40). Regarding the people, the ruler must keep himself 
on their good side, because being essentially stuck with 
them, he cannot just purge them as he can with the Great if 
things go sour. He will achieve this by inspiring fear without 
inciting hatred (rationality), and by commanding respect 
(goodwill). He must also manage to make the people "need 
the government and himself" (P, IX/42), which will sustain 
the rational love relationship. 
The presence of both rationality and goodwill indicate 
that several kinds of power relationships can exist between 
the ruler and the ruled. Here I would like to go beyond 
Machiavelli and introduce a typology of power relations 
based on legitimacy that I hope will allow us to build a co-
herent cycle of regimes. The first type is brute power, sus-
tained by positive and negative sanctions, which makes it in 
the interest of the ruled to obey. The main drawback of brute 
power is its cost, as a system of incentives (rewards, police, 
etc.) must be maintained at all times. To remedy this, a ruler 
can resort to legitimate authority. A power relationship is 
legitimate when the ruled actually wants to obey, regardless 
of sanctions.15 I further distinguish between two kinds of 
legitimate authority: informal, in which obedience is per-
ceived as a means to pursue one's own values, and formal, 
which is obedience to laws and institutions. In both cases, 
the relationship is de-personalized. In brute power the agent 
obeys a known Other, in informal legitimate authority he 
obeys through his own values, and in formal legitimate au-
thority he obeys impersonal rules believed to be necessary to 
the functioning of society. 
Returning to Machiavelli, a leader can legitimize his 
power by seeking obedience through goodwill instead of 
rationality. As we saw earlier, to attract goodwill the leader 
must respect the martial and religious values favored by his 
people.16 He does not have to actually believe in those val-
ues; he has to at least pretend to be courageous, faithful, etc. 
while knowing when not to be according to the situation.17 
The illusion works, as "in general men judge more with their 
eyes than with their hands" (P, XVIII/66-7). They infer the 
motivation from the outcome; as long as the outcome is 
good,18 they stand in a state of self-deception and do not 
perceive the hypocrisy. A small number of enlightened are 
able to see through the illusion but there is nothing they can 
do against the judgment of the masses19 (P, XVIII/67). 
To earn a good reputation one must know how to per-
form good deeds; but if a ruler is good only when it serves 
him, a citizen may love him if he also benefits from the deed, 
but he will not necessarily respect him. If a ruler wants to be 
respected while performing good deeds instrumentally, he 
must not appear to be motivated by rationality. Machiavelli 
saw this problem in the paradox of liberality: "(...) liberality, 
when so practiced that you get a reputation for it, damages 
you, because if you exercise that quality wisely and rightfully, 
it is not recognized, and you do not avoid the reproach of 
practicing its opposite" (P, XVI/59). If you show liberality 
only when necessary, "the masses will reckon that they do 
not have that benefit from you but from your adversaries; 
and since they properly will fear that when the necessity has 
passed you will take back what you have been forced to give 
them, they will not feel any obligation to you" (D, 1, 
XXXII/263). This is why "[p]rudent men always and in all 
their actions win credit from circumstances, even though 
necessity forces them to such acts in any case" (D, 1, 
LI/299): if you want to be known as a benefactor, your ges-
ture must appear both deliberate and disinterested. 
In short, the Great want to dominate the people, who ev-
idently do not want to be dominated. Without a ruler to keep 
them apart, the conflict would quickly escalate, leading to a 
division of the state into factions and its eventual downfall 
(D, 1, VII/211-2). The ruler must earn the respect of agents 
disposed to goodwill, be either loved or feared by rational 
agents, and find a way to neutralize agents driven by ambi-
tion. The one thing most effective in keeping everyone in 
their place however is formal legitimate authority, in other 
words the laws and institutions of the state. 
 
The cycle of regimes 
 
The kind of authority a ruler will establish in a state will 
determine the kind of regime in place. We have retained 
three main regimes in Machiavelli's work; they will corre-
spond to our typology of power previously mentioned. Tyr-
anny is characterized by brute exercise of power; the tyrant 
does not look for goodwill and is content to rule with an iron 
hand. In a principality (including monarchy), brute power is 
still largely present but the ruler also seeks informal legiti-
macy, mainly by respecting -- or seeming to respect -- the 
values of the people. Lastly, in a republic, legitimacy is 
founded first and foremost on the laws and institutions of 
the state. Laws are also present in principalities; the more 
good laws there are, the less latitude a Prince enjoys (D, 1, 
LVIII/313-4), but for that type of regime the focus will be on 
values. In our model, following much of what Machiavelli 
has to say on the subject, we will treat tyranny as a degener-
ate form of government and direct our attention to the finer 
points distinguishing principalities and republics. 
 
Foundation and succession 
At the foundation of the state, even if fortune plays a capital 
role, and choice is always necessity well understood, never-
theless for Machiavelli the type of regime is at the discretion 
of the founder.20 Circumstances merely suggest the appro-
priate regime. A republic is better suited to relative social 
equality, and a principality to inequality. Inequality is de-
fined by the presence of "gentlemen", great landowners 
exercising power over their subjects and "altogether hostile 
to all free government" (D, 1, LV/308-9). A Prince needs 
them; they allow him to decentralize or shall we say "out-
source" his brute personal power somewhat. If a founder 
decides against nature to establish a republic in inequality, 
he will have to eradicate the gentleman class, and if he wants 
to establish a principality in equality, he will have to create it 
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by conferring titles and wealth to certain individuals (D, 1, 
LV/309). In any case, the essential task of the founder is to 
promulgate the laws that will allow a non-destructive coex-
istence of the humors in the state. To this end he must act 
alone and hold great personal power over the citizenry for 
two reasons: first, citizens by themselves would never reach 
a reasonable agreement over the proper laws to adopt (D, 1, 
IX/218), and second, people are suspicious and incredulous 
of the new regime, while they have no qualms obeying the 
laws once established (P, VI/26-7). The founder must also be 
strong enough to resist the opposition from the beneficiaries 
of the previous regime. Without virtù however, such a 
founder might well drive his state to tyranny, intentionally 
or not. A good founder must imperatively put the interests of 
the state above his own and take the necessary decisions to 
ensure long-term stability even if it means foregoing imme-
diate benefits for the people. It is the prerogative of the 
virtuoso founder.21 He has to protect the interests of the 
state through written laws. Since virtù is so rare he must 
expect his successors to be careless or even ambitious, so he 
will take care to limit their power. 
If the founder has enough virtù to provide his state with 
good institutions, his successor will not have to be as bril-
liant as himself to keep the state strong. In a principality, 
succession is primarily hereditary. As long as traditions and 
values are respected, a rational Prince can endure; if he tries 
to change everything he will not last long (P, II/12; D, 3, 
V/427). Since in a principality institutions have a lesser role, 
the stability of the state will depend on a contingency, the 
quality of the succession. Two consecutive virtuoso Princes 
"often do very great things and their fame rises to the sky" 
(D, 1, XIX/244); two weak Princes in succession will spell 
the doom of the state. In a republic, command of the state is 
confined to several individuals chosen by the people. The 
relative equality found in a republic allows for a greater 
selection of worthy candidates. Selection in a healthy repub-
lic is based on merit and reputation (D, 1, XX/246). The 
people can choose more wisely than a Prince, first because 
the former evaluates public service while the latter is more 
interested in private service to himself (D, 3, XXIV/504-7; 
McCormick 2001: 305), second because the people as a 
collective have a tendency to be more rational, and less 
prone to emotions than a Prince (D, 1, XLVII/294; D, 1, 
LVIII/316). The people also look for their own safety, which 
is always good for the state. We must note that in all kinds of 
regimes, succession can result from more or less violent 
overthrow, either from inside or outside. Machiavelli has 
much to say about this, but that would be a topic for another 
study. 
 
Degeneration of the state 
Machiavelli's state is entropic. It takes excellent men and 
institutions to hold it together, and all must adapt to an ever-
changing fortune. We can find that in Machiavelli's various 
social mechanisms leading to degeneration, most of them 
essentially come down to a domination by ambitious Greats 
who rule for their own benefits or for their faction. Rarely 
will the people be in a position of unwarranted domination, 
but it is possible.22 We have already seen how a principality 
can degenerate if the hereditary Princes are not up to the 
task, a mechanism not operative in republics. The Great have 
different strategies to grasp power within their reach, 
whether they face the informal legitimate authority of a 
Prince or the formal authority of the institutions of a repub-
lic. 
In a principality, power relies chiefly on reputation. If a 
Prince can earn the esteem of the people, he will be able to 
guard himself against conspiracies from the Great, as the 
latter will never dare confront popular wrath (P, XIX/68-69; 
D, 3, VI/444). Fear of punishment can also discourage con-
spirators (P, XVII/62). In a well-ordered republic "where no 
evil has begun", nobody conspires against the state (D, 3, 
VI/444). As the locus of power in a principality resides most-
ly in the leader and little in the institutions, the struggle of 
the Great against the Prince must take place at a personal 
level. The Prince should keep the Great at a distance while 
making sure not to generate hatred, as that would motivate 
more extreme actions, and both should seek the good graces 
of the people. 
In the republican system, institutions replace personality 
as the locus of power. Arbitration between humors is no 
longer the role of a single man, but of an impersonal magis-
trate that allows the people to indict overambitious citizens. 
Magistrates are imbued with formal legitimacy, they operate 
"without private forces and without foreign forces, which are 
the ones that ruin free government", rather with "public 
forces and means, which have their definite limits" (D, 1, 
VII/212). On top of their deterrent effect on potential ene-
mies of the republic, magistrates provide "an outlet for the 
discharge of those partisan hatreds that develop in cities in 
various ways against various citizens" (D, 1, VII/211). Re-
course to a reliable and neutral judiciary helps to avoid the 
kind of power struggle common in principalities, which leads 
to factions and the fractioning of the common interest into 
various group interests. Machiavelli strongly condemns 
indictments performed outside the judiciary (calunnie, D, 1, 
VIII/214-7). Such slanders work by stirring up prejudice in 
the people against a particular citizen, re-personalizing the 
power struggle that republican institutions seek to avoid. 
Along with the formal legitimate authority of the republic 
comes a new type of power relation between the state and 
the Great. In a principality, the Prince has a duty to honor 
the Great who contribute positively to the state, but such 
honor can elevate the reputation of ambitious individuals to 
dangerous levels; against those the Prince must be ungrate-
ful.23 He must counteract such individuals through threat of 
punishment (D, 1, XXIX/259). A republic in a similar pre-
dicament relies instead on institutions: "the free community 
confers honors and rewards for certain honorable and estab-
lished causes, and except for these does not reward or honor 
anybody" (D, 1, XVI/235), as opposed to the subjective eval-
uations of a Prince. An ambitious citizen can exploit this 
situation, earning public trust by pretending to work for the 
good of the state until his reputation is high enough to make 
an attempt on the seat of power (D, 1, XLVI/290-1). This 
works because on the one hand honors are given according 
to rules and as long as you respect them your reputation will 
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rise, and on the other hand people are easily fooled by indi-
viduals who seem to respect their values as embodied in the 
rules. The Prince appears to have an advantage in this situa-
tion. Since he rules alone, he has more freedom to intervene 
against an ambitious and hypocritical benefactor. Machiavel-
li proposes a peculiar strategy for republics: give honors to 
as much citizens as possible and let them compete against 
one another; that way, they will not covet the state (D, 1, 
XXX/261). 
The other difficulty regarding reputation and republics 
concerns citizen gratitude towards an impersonal institution. 
For Lefort (1972: 494), republics are by nature ungrateful; 
those who earn honors in a republic do not feel they owe 
anything back to the state.24 Since institutions are not capa-
ble of distinguishing hypocrites from genuinely good men, 
the latter might come to feel envy and resentment (D, 3, 
XVI/469). Institutions are unable to forge a love or fear 
relationship like a Prince can. We must not forget however 
the advantage of an impersonal reward and punishment 
system in serving the public interest. 
Aside from ambition as a source of degenerative mecha-
nisms, we must also add forgetfulness. We saw in the intro-
duction that in the Polybian cycle, rulers forget over time 
how to properly manage the humoric conflict, with disas-
trous results. Forgetfulness and lack of interest are also 
present in the Machiavellian cycle. At the foundation, the 
ruler by necessity must address the problem of humoric 
conflict; however, in periods of stability, rulers lacking virtù 
neglect their duty and thus increase power opportunities for 
ambitious Greats and the possibility of faction formation. 
Even considering that republics include laws regulating the 
humors, "[t]hese legal means need to be brought to life by 
the wisdom of a citizen who courageously strives to enforce 
them against the power of those who violate them" (D, 3, 
I/420). We easily forget that one of the most important 
duties of a Prince (and of a people, one can presume) is to 
always "take care not to make the rich desperate, and to 
satisfy the people and keep them contented" (P, XIX/70). 
 
Corruption and refoundation 
A state is said to be corrupted at the moment the rulers 
pursue their own (or their factions') interest over the com-
mon interest. A principality becomes corrupted when an 
ambitious citizen becomes Prince, either by hereditary suc-
cession or by usurpation. Corruption in a republic emerges 
through the nomination of citizens to state offices on the 
basis of money and power instead of merit, which leads to 
officeholders governing for themselves (D, 1, XVIII/241-2). 
The laws of a republic have a tendency to change under 
corruption (the rulers will turn them to their advantage) but 
its institutions remain stable (D, 1, XVIII/241), thus creating 
a gap between the institutions (including the Constitution) 
expressing the "first principles" of the free state and the laws 
now based on particular interests. The institutions so weak-
ened become ripe targets for exploitation. They cannot on 
their own maintain the state; its officeholders, along with 
their electors, must be willing to work for the public good (D, 
1, XVIII/242). 
Corruption can still be fought as long as it has not spread 
beyond the highest levels of the state. It is possible to bring 
the state back to its first principles by getting rid of the inju-
rious leaders and by reforming the unjust laws.25 But if cor-
ruption spreads to the populace, the state is essentially lost 
and simply replacing the leaders will do no good. Wide-
spread corruption stems from inequality among the people 
(D, 1, XVII/240). It is important to note at this point that 
corruption originates from the leaders and never from the 
people (Germino 1972: 66-7). A corrupt leadership often 
results in factions, and when these factions become large 
enough each citizen will be requested to pick sides and the 
entire state will become divided. At that point the public 
good is no longer a concern for anyone.26 
A state corrupted throughout cannot be saved; it can only 
be replaced, or refounded, by a single all-powerful man, 
which will lead to either a principality or a tyranny. Refound-
ing a corrupt state is different than the ordinary foundation 
of a state. Powerful interests must first be fought, and since 
laws and institutions no longer work properly, the only 
remaining method is violence, leading to a conundrum: 
 
(...) a good man will seldom attempt to become prince by 
evil methods, even though his purpose be good; on the other 
hand a wicked man, when he has become prince, will sel-
dom try to do what is right, for it never will come into his 
mind to use rightly the authority he has gained wickedly (D, 
1, XVIII/243). 
 
Virtù seems to be needed more here than in a straightfor-
ward foundation, due to the added difficulty created by 
corruption. Consequently, the new state runs a greater risk 
to become a tyranny. If successful, the refounded state 
should be a principality. It is not suitable for a republic im-
mediately, since a corrupted failed state has by definition a 




We have sought to build a coherent model of Machiavelli's 
cycle of regimes that is as simple as possible. It took us a 
good deal of analysis of Machiavelli's scattered thoughts on 
politics to achieve that end. We can summarize the cycle the 
following way (see Appendix). 
We start with three kinds of regimes, defined by their 
power relations between the ruler(s) of the state and the 
citizens. Tyranny is a degenerate, unstable form of govern-
ment where the tyrant rules for himself; this type of state is 
extremely hard to maintain. In a principality, the Prince 
seeks to legitimize his power through reputation. To this end 
he has to be seen as endorsing the values of the people and 
working for the common good. The good done to the people 
along with the greater reliability and lesser cost of legitimate 
authority will make for a much more stable state. As flagrant 
inequalities are smoothed out in the populace, a principality 
can move on to become a republic, an even more stable form 
of government where the formal authority of the rule of law 
prevails. 
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Principalities and republics are both prone to degenera-
tion and corruption. In all regimes, the Great and the people 
oppose each other, and many ambitious citizens, especially 
among the Great, have their eyes on the throne with the 
intention of using it for their own benefits. Internal conflicts 
take on a different shape depending on the power structure. 
In principalities, the conflict is personal; the Prince and the 
Great are pitted against each other in intrigue and violence. 
The institutions of a republic can prevent much of these 
personal confrontations, but then the locus of conflict shifts 
towards the exploitation of those institutions. Through the 
impersonal state, ambitious individuals can rise in rank and 
reputation, and get themselves nominated in positions of 
power. Republics, however, are less prone to degeneration 
than principalities, mainly because in the former, the people 
have a greater say and they have the public good at heart. 
This ensures that they provide the state with good laws and 
an impersonal judicial branch. 
Corruption starts at the top, when ambitious rulers take 
command and govern for themselves or their faction's bene-
fits. Corruption is inevitable; even if the regime is exception-
ally good, the rarity of virtù, the natural forgetfulness of men 
and the ever-changing fortune will ensure that this situation 
will not last long unless the regime can periodically reinvent 
itself. At some point the state becomes unstable but can still 
be rescued through a change of leadership. If corruption is 
left to spread through the people, all is lost and the state 
must be refounded completely. The violence and radical 
means needed to overcome a corrupt state will lead to a 
tyrant, or in the best case, a Prince, and the cycle begins 
anew. 
As we can see, Machiavelli's cycle of regime does not 
form a perfect circle as is the case with Polybius. Machiavelli 
focuses his attention on two general types of regimes, princi-
palities and republics. Both will degenerate over time, in 
accord with Polybius' anacyclosis, but the net result is here 
in flux. While Polybius maintains that the succession of 
regimes must follow a certain order, Machiavelli only sug-
gests tendencies. The final result will depend on more that 
the nature of the previous regime, it will crucially depend on 
sociological (egalitarian vs. non-egalitarian society), person-
al (the new ruler's character) and geopolitical factors. An-
other difference lies in the degenerative mechanisms. Polyb-
ius proposes a simple mechanism involving the passage of 
time and instantiated in succession and forgetfulness, that is 
applicable to all "good" regimes. Machiavelli applies a simi-
lar mechanism regarding principalities, but creates a whole 
new set of mechanisms dealing with the formal authority 
structure found in republics. In his discussion of the Polybi-
an cycle, Machiavelli agrees that the "mixed constitution" is 
the best regime, mainly because degeneration will be much 
slower.27 In the rest of his work however, he drops this lan-
guage to refer directly to republics. It is clear to me that 
Machiavelli talks about two distinctively good regimes, and 
not about one "single-constitution" regime (principality) as a 
subset of the "mixed-constitution" republic, which allows me 
to consider republics as a distinct regime instead of an ag-
gregate. 
There remains a crucial element we have not incorpo-
rated in our model, an aspect of politics that takes a large 
space in Machiavelli's work, and that is foreign policy. We 
have focused our attention entirely on the internal dynamics 
of politics. I believe that the cycle of regimes can stand on its 
own as it is and provide a valuable key in understanding 
Machiavelli's political science. Evidently, the model would be 
more complete, albeit much more complicated, if we inte-
grated war, conquest and diplomacy into the model. The 
obvious connection between the cycle and international 
politics is when a state becomes weak and unstable, it is 
prone to foreign intervention. Machiavelli's exhortation for a 
stable state is precisely to ensure that it remains free, i.e. 
independent on the international scene. I will leave these 
refinements to more qualified scholars to pursue. 
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Endnotes 	  
1 Works by Machiavelli will be referenced by (P, book/pp)  for the 
Prince, and (D, book, chapter/pp) for the Discourses on Livy. 
Page numbers correspond to the Gilbert translation listed in the 
bibliography, both in vol. 1. 	  
	  
2  There is an interpretation of the Discourses that it has been 
written in two parts, one before Machiavelli wrote the Prince 
and one after, and that both parts differ substantially in their 
approach to politics. To complicate matters, it is said that the 
chapters of the first part has been scattered among the second 
part (an hypothesis proposed by G. Sasso and F. Gilbert; see La-
rivaille 1982: 12 n.3). A second hypothesis concerns Machiavel-
li's knowledge of Book VI of Polybius, the one pertaining to the 
cycle of regimes. Hexter (1956) maintains that Machiavelli came 
across Book VI only in the second part of the Discourses. That 
would mean, according to Larivaille's chapter ordering of the 
Discourses (182), that the discussion on the relationship be-
tween the Great and the people would have been written in ig-
norance of Polybius' cycle. If this is the case, my own model 
could not stand, because I suppose the Discourses to form a sin-
gle coherent text, to be read alongside the Prince. To my de-
fense, I refer to Whitfield (1958), who makes a convincing case 
that the "two texts" hypothesis is based on weak conjectures, 
and that we have no particular reason to suppose Machiavelli 
did not know Polybius VI from the start (see also Anglo 1969: 
ch. 3). 
3  See also Von Fritz (1954: 60-61) for a similar description. Mans-
field (2001: 39) notes that for Polybius the objective of the 
mixed regime is justice, while for Machiavelli it is stability. 
4 The most notable exceptions are when he claims that Fortune 
governs the actions of men, but see the discussion below. 
5  Althusser (2006: 251-2) remarks that what Machiavelli presents 
as an anthropology is in fact political psychology. In the former, 
all agents share the same basic attributes (as in Hobbes); in the 
latter, attributes are variable and dependent on each agent's po-
litical position (prince, noble or citizen). We will interpret Mach-
iavelli as proposing an anthropology, but one in which the sali-
ence of certain attributes depend on the political situation. 
6 "(...)  he who too much endeavors to be feared, if he exceeds the 
norm ever so little, gets hated" (D, 3, XXI/478). 
7 In the Tercets on Ambition, Ambition and Avarice walk together 
(in Gilbert, vol. 2: 735). Also: "Nature gave you hands and 
speech, and with them she gave you also ambition and avarice, 
with which her bounty is cancelled" (The Golden Ass, VIII, in 
Gilbert, vol. 2: 772). 
8 "But on the part of the prince, there are the majesty of his 
princely rank, the laws, the defensive measures of his friends 
and of the state -- which protect him. Hence, if to all these 
things is added the people's good will, it is impossible for anyone 
to be rash enough to conspire" (P, XIX/69). Another distinction 
between rationality and reputation: "Therefore, considering 
when it is easy and when it is hard to get a people to accept 
something, one can make this distinction: either what you are 
trying to persuade them of shows on its surface gain or loss; or 
the decision to be made seems courageous or cowardly" (D, 1, 
LIII/303). 
9 Those are the martial values aforementioned, along with reli-
gious values: "(...) all mercy, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, 
all religion" (P, XVIII/66). 
10 His basis is an interpretation of The Prince, XXIII, on the coun-
cillors: "One lies from 'fear of authority' (riverenza). Therefore 	  




someone who asks for the truth runs 'the danger of being des-
pised'" (Faraklas 1997: 58 n.3). But a more throughout reading 
of this chapter reveals that asking for truth is not sufficient for 
contempt, one must also (and especially) change his mind de-
pending on advices and therefore be seen as weak and easily in-
fluenced. 
11 See for example the interpretative debates in Plamenatz (1972) 
and Ménissier (2002). The shortest and most informative defi-
nition I've found is this one: "Between the Roman scheme (mor-
al austerity) and the modern scheme (success at all costs), 
Machiavelli does not really choose" (Védrine 1972: 48). 
12 Also, there is not one great destiny, but a multitude of particular 
destinies represented by wheels inside the palace of Fortune: "as 
many wheels are turning as there are varied ways of climbing to 
those things which every living man strives to attain" (Tercets 
on Fortune, in Gilbert, vol. 2: 746). While taking care not to ex-
aggerate meaning here, this passage indicates that each individ-
ual has a destiny somewhat influenced by his choices. 
13 Wherever the ruler comes from, the Great or the people, is 
largely irrelevant since he has to rise above the humors, and a 
ruler of either origin will have to adopt the same strategy in 
dealing with those humors. 
14 I.e. those who show love and goodwill. We can safely drop this 
type of Great, as they play very little role in Machiavelli's work. 
This will simplify our model somewhat. 
15 Galbraith defines what he calls "implicit conditioning" thusly: 
"The acceptance of authority, the submission to the will of oth-
ers, becomes the higher preference of those submitting. (...) the 
submission is considered to be normal, proper, or traditionally 
correct" (Galbraith 1983: 24). See also Lukes (1977) and Wrong 
(1988). 
16 On religion, see D, 1, XII/226-9. 
17 Pretending is a rational action, while being genuinely motivated 
by those values is not rational but rather emotional, since the 
agent does not aim to maximize his utility (Author 2007). The 
ruler genuinely motivated by values would not survive for long 
in Machiavelli's world, as he could not adjust his behavior to his 
changing fortune. 
18 Among the deeds worthy of esteem, we find first of all the de-
fense of the state, then great works, military victories, and the 
recognition of excellence among citizens (P, XXI/81-4). 
19  And in any case, "even the shrewdest observers are largely 
condemned to judge by appearances" (Skinner 1992: 52). 
20 On Romulus and his successors: "their purpose was to found a 
kingdom and not a republic" (D, 1, II/200).  
21 "These men are able to distinguish between glory and narrow 
ambition, between the common good and private advantage. 
They are the true benefactors of the human race" (Germino 
1972: 71). 
22 "If we are to discuss either people or prince when unrestrained, 
fewer defects will be seen in the people than in the prince, and 
they will be smaller and easier to remedy" (D, 1, LVIII/317), as 
an unfettered populace will still look to defend the public good, 
while a Prince will mainly be concerned with his own person. 	  
	  
23 For Machiavelli, ingratitude against someone who has served 
the state well originates either from avarice or suspicion (sospet-
to). Avarice is founded on cupidity and should be castigated; to 
disgrace someone by avarice constitutes "a folly that has no ex-
cuse" (D, 1, XXIX/257). Suspicion, on the other hand, results 
from rational reflection about the political menace of an indi-
vidual basking in glory; it is excusable and sometimes necessary 
for the survival of the regime. 
24 See also D, 1, XVI/235-8. 
25 Which leads Germino (1972: 66-7) to note that corruption is not 
directly caused by human nature, since man has the power to 
stop it . 
26  Lazzeri (1999: 251-2) offers an interesting alternative interpre-
tation. For him, the people and the Great are equally prone to 
ambition, the difference being that only the Great hold the ma-
terial and organizational resources necessary to render their 
ambition effective. When the state becomes corrupted, opportu-
nities arise for the people to satisfy their own ambitions. Del 
Lucchese (2009) makes a similar point reading the Florentine 
Histories. But even if popular ambition is conceivable, as long as 
it remains dependant on circumstances created by ambitious 
Greats, the latter retains explanatory priority. 
27  See Von Fritz (1954: 87) for this view in Polybius. 
 
